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Market Politics in an Age ofAutomation
Angus Burgin
In 1952 a young management consultant, John Diebold, took the stage to ad-
dress a crowd ofpersonnel managers in Berkeley, California. Having graduated
from Harvard Business School only the year before, Diebold-offset by a tie-
pin, horn-rimmed glasses, and neatly parted receding hair-had already molded
himself in the image of an up-and-coming executive with a reading habit and
some daring new ideas. Surveying the pace of technological change since the
Second World War, he informed his audience that their time was likely to "be
looked upon by the next two generations as the second industrial revolution."
Indeed, "every day new articles" were appearing that described recent techno-
logical developments in terms of an epochal shift. He underscored the impor-
tance of this transformation with a neologism that would serve as the title of
his debut book, and that he would later claim as his own invention: far into the
future, he predicted, this would be known as the "age ofautomation."
Diebold was precocious in describing recent technological developments as
a revolution," and singularly successful in turning their implications into a lu-
crative career, but he was right to suggest that such dramatic claims were be-
coming increasingly common. In the years following his speech, comparisons
to the Industrial Revolution coursed through popular literature as journalists,
theorists, and futurists struggled to account for the perceived implications of
automatic controls. Publications including Business Week, Fortune, and the New
Kepublic discussed the onset of a "Second Industrial Revolution."2 The head of
the United Auto Workers, Walter Reuther, warned in testimony before Congress
nat this "second phase of the industrial revolution" was likely to have a "much
greater impact than the first.3 The economist Kenneth Boulding described the
uplications of emerging technologies in world-historical terms, arguing that
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they heralded a "second great transition" from civilized to "postcivilized" soci
ety Scholars engaged in internecine arguments about how many historical dis-
junctions could be seen as comparable in scale: the Marxist theorist Ernest
Mandel reframed the era as the "long wave of the third technological revolu-
tion," and the heterodox economist Robert Heilbroner termed it the "fourth in-
dustrial revolution. But in the early 1950s many observers believed that they
were witnessing a generational shift at least as important as the arrival of the
steam engine or the onset ofmass production, and perhaps more far-reaching
in its implications.
Rhetoric of technological upheaval had, ofcourse, been widespread since the
earliest years of the Industrial Revolution. For over a century, theorists had ar-
gued that the pace of innovation was throwing politics into disarray, as past ex-
perience became an unreliable guide for future expectations. But in the wake
of the Second World War, many observers agreed that the implications of new
technologies differed from previous eras. Whereas earlier waves of mechaniza-
tion had drawn laborers away from farms and into urban and industrial em-
ployment, new capacities would lead to the effacement ofmanufacturing labor.
As Reuther reported to Congress, the crucial distinction was that "the machine
now cannot only replace human power, but can replace human judgments.""
Whereas previously, even the most sophisticated production machinery required
a cadre of employees to operate, monitor, and tend to it, future factories might
conceivably function with nary a person in sight.
Contemporary sociologists noted that the effacement ofhuman labor from
production work already seemed to be well underway. The previous half-century
had sustained a precipitous decline in agricultural employment, from over
35 percent in 1900 to 12.5 percent in 1950, but when considered in the aggre-
gate, almost none of this displaced labor had been picked up by industry. De-
spite spectacular productivity gains and a dramatic decline in working hours
for employees, manufacturers continued to employ only about one-quarter of
the labor force throughout the first halfof the twentieth century The engine of
new employment had become services, rather than industry. As C. Wright Mills
wrote the year before Diebold's speech in his breakthrough work White Colla,
evermore workers were employed in "servicing, distributing, and co-ordinating'
rather than "the extraction and production of things.""Mills appeared prescient
in 1956, when the Bureau ofLabor Statistics announced thatwhite-collar work
ers now outnumbered blue-collar workers for the first time in the history of
any industrialized society.0 From that point forward, the majority of its citizens
would no longer be directly employed in the production ofeither food or goods.
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In a seeming defiance ofgravity, the material foundations of the economy were
beginning to recede to its margins.
Many of the leading theorists of automated technologies raised ominous
questions about the long-term implications of this shift. Norbert Wiener, the
MIT mathematician and philosopher of cybernetics, warned that while the "irst
industrial revolution'" had devalued "the human arm by the competition ofma-
chinery" this new era would "devalue the human brain, at least in its simpler
and more routine decisions." The scope of environments where humans could
generate value appeared to be ever-diminishing." And even those who were san-
guine about the aggregate implications of this shift, such as Harvard economist
Wasily Leontief, frankly acknowledged that many employees were likely to be
displaced from their jobs.2 Like most economists, Leontief remained confident
that the dynamics of technological displacement were unlikely to have an ad-
verse effect on total employment figures over the short term. But many leading
social scientists-using terms such as post-maturity" (W. W. Rostow), or "post-
capitalist" (Ralf Dahrendorf), or "post-industrial" (Daniel Bell)-argued that
new technologies had transformed the social and economic environment in ways
that required dramatic new directions in public policy." From John Kenneth
Galbraith's The Afluent Society to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revo-
lution, commentators emphasized that new production technology had the
potential to generate unprecedented levels of both material abundance and
distributive inequality. Taking advantage of the former, and mitigating the lat-
ter, would require the ever more active hand of the state
But even as some leading commentators drew on the anxieties induced by
technological change to advocate an expanded role for the government, others
were arriving at a very different set of conclusions. From perches in business
schools, or management consultancies, or the shelves of airport bookstores, they
inverted the assumptions of their peers: rather than seeing the state as a solu-
tion to the problems posed by technology, they saw technology as the solution
to problems long confronted by the state. Automating the production process
ofered an organic way to alleviate the pathologies of industrial labor, pulling
employees away from repetitive tasks and into creative and relational work. By
tollowing the history ofthis line ofargumentation, we can begin to see how the
fraying of the New Deal order in the later decades of the twentieth century was
made possible in part by shifting views of the social implications oftechnologi-
cal change. Whereas the effects of industrial labor had generated powerful ar-
guments for regulation and social reform, the shift to knowledge work and
Service employment enabled executives and technologists to argue that the
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market was doing more than the administrative apparatus of the midcentury
state to resolve the problems of industrial society.
In recent years, historians have increasingly approached the rise ofmarket
advocacy, and the corresponding erosion of midcentury political economy, as
elements in the emergence of a "neoliberal" world order. This forward-looking
approach to the postwar era is a striking departure from the declensionist frame-
work adopted by the authors of this volume's predecessor-The Rise and Fall of
the New Deal Order-three decades ago. "The old order is dead," the editors of
that volume announced, and "nothing with the same combination ofprogram-
matic coherence, ideological credibility, and mass political appeal has arisen to
take its place. We live inside a political parenthesis."15 Today, by contrast, 1989
looks more like a watershed than a parenthetical, as revolutions across Eastern
Europe seemed to mark a global and transideological embrace of the market-
based incentives championed by Thatcher and Reagan. One of the central chal-
lenges for this volume, then, is to explain not only the fall of the New Deal order
but also the sources ofthe alternative approach to political economy that emerged
in its stead.
Thus far, leading accounts of the rise ofneoliberalism have focused first on
a crisis ofaccumulation in the 1970s, provoked by the unraveling of contradic
tions deeply embedded in the workings of the midcentury economic order, and
second on the theoretical, political, and rhetorical activities of elite intellectu-
als and financial interests, who used sophisticated networking and public rela-
tions strategies to persuade those in positions ofpolitical influence to implement
policies of austerity and deregulation. The political ferment surrounding au-
tomation in the 1950s is suggestive of a third story, which played a crucial role
in both the structural and the ideological elaboration of neoliberalism. In the
decades that followed the Second World War, the growing capacity ofmachines
to perform repetitive tasks would dramatically lower the costs associated with
financialization and globalization, transform the power dynamics between cap-
ital and labor, and enable the rise of a new conceptual and rhetorical emphasis
on the entrepreneurial self. At the very height of the New Deal order, a broad
range of theorists recognized the potential scale and significance of this shift,
and began to push both political and management discussions away from pre-
sent problems and toward future possibilities.
The languages the early theorists ofautomation adopted, and the issues they
brought to the foreground, reveal how the subject of their analysis began affect
ing political discourse even as its employment implications remained incipient.
They focused attention foremost on how automation was beginning to affect the
experience of work, as employees were gradually shifted away from highly re
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petitive tasks and toward positions more suited to the unique capacities ofhuman
cognition. They grappled extensively with the resulting problem ofdisplacement
and is potential effects on both individual lives and collective bargaining. And
they emphasized that the structure ofbusiness life was entering the early stages
ofa dramatic transformation, which would be wrought by technology rather
than the state. The political response to the felt problems of the era would there-
fore depend, to a perhaps unprecedented degree, on forecasts about the trajec-
tory of changes that were only beginning to unfold.
John Diebold-as a prominent evangelist for automation who navigated be-
tween engagements with social theory, paid advice to managers, and popular
speeches and articles directed to clerical and blue-collar laborers-played a lead-
ing role in interpreting the implications of new workplace technologies for an
anxious public. In this capacity he found himself striking a delicate balance be-
tween stoking enthusiasm about the extraordinary potential of automated con-
trols and calming anxieties induced by the perception of change. He did so by
decoupling the concepts of"revolution' and "upheaval": his central message was
that novel technologieswould transform social life and the workplace experience,
but the effects would be socially beneficial and would require no exceptional
regulation or restraint. Yes, the age of automation would be "a world in which
fewer and fewer people work in factories"-but that meant "a world in which less
human effort will be required for monotonous and tedious work" "the work
week is greatly shortened," and "the pace of life slows down" The dynamics of
technological change were ushering in a future "in which leisure becomes the
center of life, rather than the fringe."7 The primary role of government would
no longer be to redress the pathological side effects of technology, but rather to
prepare people to best take advantage of the extraordinary opportunities it
presented. A social order focused on the maintenance of safety and stability
could begin to make way for one focused on the development ofhuman capital
and the inducement of further innovations. Diebold accorded himself the role
of guide on this cliff walk to utopia, and his instructions provide continued
insight into the pathways his audiences took.
he postwar knowledge economy grew in tandem with the rise ofmanagement
consulting, as an increasing commodification of information and expertise put
a premium on those who could transfer knowledge about business practices
across industries and organizations. Harvard Business School-with its gen-
eel traditions and case-centered pedagogy-proved especially adept at training
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ambitious college graduates for success in this emerging career." In pursuit of
his MBA there in 1951, John Diebold led a team of classmates on a year-long
project, "Making the Automated Factory a Reality," which achieved some na-
tional press by addressing "what is technologically possible in the way of auto-
matic production."20 The project made a deep impression on him, and he quickly
perceived that the field would present lucrative opportunities to those who cul-
tivated expertise in it. He initially pursued those interests at the consulting firm
Griffenhagen & Associates, but quickly grew frustrated with his superiors and
left to start his own consultancy.2 Within a year he had published the leading
book on the subject and become the editor ofAutomatic Control, one of three
newmagazines in the field.22 Before his twenty-ninth birthday his firm had six-
teen employees, he had been called as the lead witness for congressional hear-
ings on "Automation and Technological Change," and tongue-in-cheek reporters
were referring to him as the "elder statesman" of the field.23 By the end of the
decade the "Diebold Group" had grown tenfold again, served a client list that in-
cluded Boeing, General Electric, and Westinghouse, and counted Griffenhagen
& Associates as one of its nineteen subsidiaries.4 Diebold had become one of
the leading purveyors of knowledge about how to transition to the knowledge
economy: the paradigmatic professional of a postindustrial age.
Diebold's role as a conduit for information and expertise on automated tech
nologies required him to triangulate between a diverse array of constituencies.
Business executives employed him to help them decide which areas of their busi-
ness to automate and which to leave unchanged; politicians repeatedly drew on
his expertise in their public debates over whether and how to intervene; public
audiences and magazine readers nervously sought his advice on the implications
of new control technologies for their intended careers; and theorists cited his
work as a point of origin for a burgeoning literature on the social implications
of economic change. While Diebold maintained the management consultant's
studiously nonpartisan public persona, he was convinced of automation's lar-
gesse and eager to present himself as the bearer of good news. His overriding
concern was that suspicions of technologywould lead labor unions, politicians,
and theorists to adopt an oppositional stance that would forestall or dissipate
its transformative force. Correspondingly, he developed a set ofarguments that
presented the inherent dynamics ofautomation as nonthreatening, enabling, and
inevitable. He used his public persona to build public support for the techno-
logical transformations that his consulting business served.
Through a process of trial and error, Diebold settled on a set of arguments
that he found effective at convincing audiences that their anxieties about this
impending "revolution" were misplaced. His first claim was that the transition
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between industrialism and postindustrialism would be self-modulating. In con-
trast to the wrenching and cyclical traumas of agrarian decline, the effacement
ofmanufacturing employment would proceed at a predictable and manageable
pace, and those who were displaced would have little trouble finding new and
perhaps superior positions. Second, Diebold argued that its characteristic forms
ofemployment would be creative. Unlike the deadening and repetitive tasks as-
sociated with many forms of industrial labor, the jobs fostered by automation
would tend to be relational and dynamic. In this way they would resolve many
ofthe social-psychological problems that earlier versions of capitalism had cre
ated. Third, he emphasized that the technological transformations wrought by
market forces were inevitable and irreversible. The inherent logic of technologi
cal development could not be successfully resisted, and the geopolitical frame
work ofthe Cold War made any attempt to alter or delay its progression unwise.
In purveying these views, Diebold helped to pioneer a set of arguments that
ofbusiness interests in the
decades that followed. This popularization was attributable in part to other
management consultants and theorists, most notably Diebold's friend and col-
league Peter Drucker, who legitimated, formalized, and expanded upon some
of the ideas Diebold was propounding throughout the 1950s and 1960s.5
Together Diebold, Drucker, and their peers established a genre of futurism
that emphasized the pathological nature of industrial labor conditions while
appealing to technology, rather than social policy, as the principal source of
solutions26 They looked toward a postindustrial future in which capitalism
would overcome the very sense of alienation it had engendered, and in which
the long-standing inequities between capital and labor would break down as
the nature and meaning of work transformed. This escape from the opposi-
tional politics of the industrial era played a crucial role in the vogue for "entre-
preneurship" that began to take hold between the late 1950s and the early 1970s,
in the techno-optimism of Silicon Valley, and in the meritocratic ethos of the
coastal knowledge workers who reframed Democratic policy making over the
hinal third of the twentieth century27 In this sense, the well-chronicled rise of
market-centered politics from the 1960s to the 1980s was not merely a return to
the laissez-faire rhetoric of earlier eras. Rather, it was built on a belief that the
nature of labor had transformed: in an age ofautomation, the experience ofwork
struck some-however paradoxically-as increasingly human, thereby render-
ing many of the workplace concessions and protections associated with the
were widely adopted by technologists and advocat
New Deal order obsolete.
Echoes of Diebold's arguments were picked up even by a broad range of
centrist and left-leaning critics and political figures who held more jaundiced
A New Order Takes Shape150
views ofbusiness interests. Many labor leaders met the challenge ofautomation
with a policy of incremental negotiation based on the premise that its onset
would be gradual, Marxist theorists acknowledged that postindustrial labor was
less alienating than its predecessors, and the most prominent critics of technol.
ogy conceded that little could be done to stop its relentless advance. Scholars
across political lines parroted the notion that automation presented a different
set ofchallenges and opportunities from previous technologies: it would be less
traumatic in its reshaping of employment, less exploitative in its labor relation-
ships, and less susceptible to regulatory control and oversight. Scholars in later
decades have continued to debate the accuracy ofthose predictions. Regardless,
it is clear that by the early 1950s the politics of technological transformation-a
primary source ofenergy and inspiration for Marxists and progressives alike-
had quietly become a powerful weapon in the arsenal of market advocates.
Economists had long argued against fears of technological unemployment by
citing historical evidence that new production methods had not, in the aggre-
gate, led to job displacement. The effacement of specific occupations led invari-
ably to the creation of others." In the early 1950s, however, many weren't
persuaded by those arguments. Their concern was that technologies that replaced
mental labor would have different effects from technologies that replaced phys-
ical labor. In a series of articles in the New York Review of Books in the early
1960s, the prominent New School economist Robert Heilbroner worried that
workers who were supplanted by machines would have nowhere else to go. Pre-
viously, those who were displaced from farms and factories had found refuge in
the service sector; now, even these positions were being replaced by machines
The last sector of the market economy has been, so to speak, preempted by ma-
chinery and... there is now no expansive market sector left," he wrote. His-
torical data was useless, as it had never taken such a circumstance into account
Wassily Leontief, writing in the same publication, drew an elaborate analogy to
substantiate Heilbroner's concern. In 1907 a national "Horse Commission' on
technology and automation would have been very sanguine, on the basis ofcen-
turies ofhistorical data, about the continued employment ofhorses; but within
a decade, equine functions had been largely replaced, and horses suddenly of
fered economic advantages only in marginal roles. "What happened to horses
conceivably could, but, of course, under no circumstances would be allowed, to
happen to human beings who gain their livelihood by selling their labor in a
world in which more and more productive tasks can be performed better and
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more cheaply by machines."30 Leontief's colleague Alvin Hansen speculated in
the New Republic that the adoption of new technologies in the service sector
might force increasingly elaborate "makework" to be devised.3" Such specula-
tions suggested that the confidence derived from historical experience might
prove paper-thin: ifthe current economic transitionwas truly revolutionary, pre-
cedents could no longer be trusted.
The reborn technological utopianism of the early 1950s, therefore, was al-
ways yoked to concerns about the marginalization of human contributions to
the productive process. "So fantastic are the potentialities ofnew control devices
that it is possible to visualize acres of factory or office space in which no worker
is needed' read one New York Times report in 195. "Automated equipment can
process raw materials, assemble them into finished goods, package them and
load them into freight cars without direct human help:" Such devices could even
"adjust to variable productive conditions, correct their own mistakes, inspect
the finished product and even change their own parts when parts break or wear
out." The only humans in such factories spent their time "watching the flashing
lights" and "checking the dials."2 It was then possible to envision these entirely
machine-produced goods arriving at stores where very few humans would be
directly involved in the sale. According to the University ofMassachusetts econ-
omist Ben Seligman, items would likely soon be disseminated via "a completely
automated retail establishment" in which customers placed orders that would
then be delivered, by automatic machines, to the checkout counter. Thus, soci-
ety would "come closer and closer to a world of work without men."3 As the
French sociologist Georges Friedmann wrote, "for most men and women pres-
ently engaged in physical or manual labor, work in the traditional sense of the
term is fated to disappear."4 In the managerial literature's droll graphical lan-
guage, the humans simply vanished (see Figure 8.1). Diebold's audiences were
not alone in worrying about the human implications of a world in which, to
adopt his own unsettling phrase, "the buttons push themselves."5
Diebold, who gave talks across the country following the publication ofhis
1952 bookAutomation and often served as a paid speaker thereafter, frequently
engaged in dialogue with audiences that seemed anxious about the potential ef
fects of new workplace technologies. He was struck by their fears: "fear of un-
employment, displacement, inability to learn new skills, fear of the human
tragedy of individuals exposed and defenseless in a mechanized world"36 The
questions that followed his remarks became a monotonous refrain. "Doesn't au-
tomation mean workerless factories, with robots doing all the jobs? Doesn't it
mean that the plant where I earn my living will fire its 1,000 employees, install
some wonder gadgets and then hire a couple ofbutton-pushers to run the whole
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Figure 8.1. Visualization of the displacement of line workers
Source: S. A. June, The Automatic Factory: A Critical Examination (Pittsburgh: Instruments
Publishing 1955), 16.
works? Won't all factories soon do the same and cause mass unemployment?"7
These discussions made him acutely sensitive to the dangers of the rhetoric of
technological transformation: the very changes that inspired wonder and fasci-
nation could also generate anxiety and resistance.
Diebold responded to these anxieties by arguing that the shift to automated
technologies would be a gradual process, unfolding at a pace "with which we
are historically familiar and with which we are able to cope."38 He saw concerns
about the impending transformation ofmanufacturing as especially overblown,
suggesting in contrast that only a small fraction ofindustries would experience
a marginal employment decline." Large sectors of the economy, such as retail-
ing, would be almost entirely unaffected. Critics "greatly exaggerated" its
immediate implications. While those who performed especially simple or
repetitive jobs may have some reason to worry, the vast majority of workers
performed tasks that no forthcoming machine could easily replace.0 The pa-
rade of executives at the 1955 congressional hearings Automation and Techno-
logical Change were quick to adopt this line ofargumentation, often expressing
it in stronger language than Diebold adopted. In one Ford executive's phrasing,
automation was "an evolutionary and not a revolutionary process." Those who
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were driving the technological transformation proved most reluctant to describe
its implications in epochal terms.
Diebold was more willing than many executives to acknowledge that some
displacement was bound to occur, but he emphasized that its effects would be
heaviest on office workers, who had few institutional mechanisms for organized
dissent, rather than on their heavily unionized blue-collar manufacturing
counterparts.2 In his view, contemporaries tended to overrate the repetitive as-
pects of industrial line work and to underrate the reproducibility of clerical
tasks. "It is in the mechanization ofpaper work that electronics will have its most
immediate and possibly its most widespread effect on business," he wrote in
1953. "No longer will it be necessary to waste so much human labor in copying
routine information on bits of paper, filing the papers, and perhaps referring to
them and recopying data at a later date."5 He described a litany of remarkable
newmachines that were more efficient and effective than people at performing
numerous tasks, including booking flights, researching books, flying planes, an-
alyzing dress sales, and forecasting weather4 The transactions handled by the
entire trading floor of the New York Stock Exchange could be better performed
by a computer "in a one-room low-rental space in, say, outlying Flushing."45
When McCall's asked "WhenWill Your Husband Be Obsolete?," Diebold had a
grim warning for the spouses ofbrokerage clerks, court reporters, and elevator
operators, among many others: "the work of every one of these employees is
practically certain to be obsolete within the next generation."46
But Diebold always tempered his frankness about the prospect ofdisplace-
ment in discrete fields with messages of reassurance. He emphasized that auto-
mation would create as many jobs as it supplanted, and that the process of
adapting to the demands of these new positions would not require arduous re-
training. Drawing on an array of studies published in the Harvard Business Re-
view by James Bright, he argued that even unskilled workers would have little
trouble finding new positions in a world of self-regulating machines." In auto-
mated businesses, Bright had insisted, "the machine had assumed most of the
skill requirements of the job," and "the production systems were easier to run
and required less skilled labor than before. There literally was nothing for the
worker to do but 'push a button' or 'monitor' the machinery."8 Bright acknowl-
edged that the most primitive stages of mechanization required an increase in
operational skill, but as machinery became more sophisticated, the level of em-
ployee input rapidly decreased. Diebold did not share Bright's confidence in an
inverse relationship between mechanization and skill, but he agreed (and em-
phasized) that most of the jobs in an automated economywould not require fore-
boding levels of technical training. A failitywith human interactions, complex
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manual skills, or capacities for oversight would all be valued and rewarded. He
even objected to the very supposition that employment would grow scarce: ob-
serving that the relationship ofworkers to children and the elderly had entered
into a precipitous decline, he predicted that jobs would remain plentiful for the
indefinite future" Peter Drucker went so far as to warn, in Harper's, about a
coming labor shortage," the catastrophic effects ofwhich automation could
forestall. Concerns that automation would cause an onset oftechnological un-
employment or the effacement ofunskilled labor were rooted, according to this
line of argument, in a misreading of its aggregate effects and a misinterpreta-
tion of economic trends.
Political debates always draw heavily on extrapolations from recent trends
into a projected future. However, the widespread recognition that automated
controls were novel and politically important made the postwar decades a cru-
cial inflection point, a moment when a heightened sense of technological un-
certainty forced people in positions of influence to stake out positions based on
limited experience and an unusual degree of conjecture. Was the arrival of a-
tomation a wrenching shift that required extraordinary investment-new con-
trols over capital-labor relations, dramatic investments in education, and a
growing safety net to aid those caught in its crosshairs? Or was it an incremen-
tal adjustment best met by incremental negotiations along established lines?
Given Diebold's position and proclivities, it is predictable that he advocated for
the latter interpretation, citing deep concern that the former would lead to reg-
ulations that would stifle the pace of technological change and limit its poten-
tial largesse.
Surprisingly, however, many labor leaders in the 1950s and early 1960s
echoed his views. Over the course of the 1950s a wide range ofunions accepted
Diebold's claims for the potential benefits of automation as well as his argument
that its advance would be slow: it was as much an opportunity to be exploited
as a looming threat. A conference of union leaders on the progress of automa-
tion in April 1955, for instance, elicited repeated statements ofvalidation. "All
of us at this table welcome automation," the CIO's associate director of research
asserted; "we rejoice at the tremendous advances in output, in national strength,
in leisure, in working and living conditions that the new technology makes pos-
sible. According to the president of the Communication Workers of Amer
ica, there was "no doubt that automation can usher in a new and great era, if we
begin to act now.3 The congressional hearings later that year were marked by
still more insistent endorsements, "We fully realize that the potential benefits
of automation are great, ifproperly handled" Walter Reuther emphasized to the
assembled congressmen. "If only a fraction of what technologists promise for
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the future is true, within a very few years automation can and should make pos-
sible a four-day workweek, longer vacation periods, opportunities for earlier
retirement, as well as a vast increase in our material standards ofliving"4 View
ing such statements, the New York Times reported that labor leaders appeared
to have learned "two things": "that it is impossible to stop technological ad-
vances" and "that it is contrary to the best interests of the workers themselves
even to try. In response many of them adopted an approach of strategic ac-
commodation, acknowledging the potential benefits of automation in order to
urge specific restrictions and regulations as it began tounfold.3
Such an approach presented some risks. White-collar employees had proven
notoriously dificult to unionize, and a continued decline of factory labor had
the potential to erode membership rolls. The prospect of replacingworkers with
machines also gave companies negotiating leverage, which they could use to
minimize and suppress labor demands. But Reuther and many ofhis colleagues
were impressed by the potential of these new technologies to continue the long-
term trend toward shorter workweeks, greater material abundance, and height-
ened economic security. In their view, the challenge would be to develop a policy
regime that ensured these new capacities were broadly distributed rather than
hoarded by the purchasers and possessors of capital. One survey found that
three-quarters of firm presidents believed they were entitled to "all" of the sav-
ings resulting from new machinery, suggesting precisely the perspective that
union leaders were eager to subvert.3" Reuther centered his program on the idea
ofa "guaranteed annual wage," which would slow the advance ofnew technol
ogies and soften the dislocations they caused.5# Others defied the ambivalence
oftheir constituents to prioritize a four-day workweek, in order to forestall un-
employment and ensure new productivity was partially distributed in the form
of leisure.9 The longshoremen's union successfully advocated for employment
guarantees and the creation of a compensation fund that would redirect a por
tion of the profits from labor-saving machinery to them.0 Still others empha-
sized the heightened necessity of social insurance and the importance of
regulations that would force companies to give current employees the training
and relocation funds that adaptation to new machinery often required.
The dystopic anxieties that Diebold encountered in his public tours were not
reproduced in the rhetoric and demands of most union leaders. Thus a senator,
at the conclusion of many days of debate among interested parties and experts
about the implications of automation, could remarkwith wonder that not "one
witness" had "resisted" its advance2 Such consensus became possible because
many ofthe leading figures in organized labor adopted an approach to automation
that accepted the premises, ifnot always the conclusions, ofDiebold's analysis. If
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technological change would unfold in pliable and predictable ways, unions
could aim to minimize displacement ofcurrent employees while skimming divi-
dends in both money and time. In an awkward, anomalous, and surprisingly
durable union, the prospect ofan economic revolution was married to the politics
of stasis.
Even as he emphasized that automation would unfold at a modulated piece,
Diebold allowed himself to marvel at the transformed world it would eventu-
ally yield. His success as a consultant and speaker hinged largely on his potent
futurist imagination: he glimpsed a world of five-day weekends, instant elec-
tronic publishing, videophones, talking computers, and neurally integrated
prosthetic limbs.63
Diebold's prose turned suddenly vibrant when he envisioned the radical ways
in which mundane servo-mechanisms might reform conventional practices and
professions. As employees were pulled out of factory and clerical work and into
new jobs, theywould find themselves engaging with their duties and coworkers
in new and different ways. Their positions would be less repetitive, less isolating
and less restrictive of their human capacity for judgment and interaction. Even
the time structure ofworking lives would transform, as the rhythmic disciplines
of industrialism gave way to an era of increased flexibility and independence. He
frequently gestured toward the liberatory potential of automated technologies:
after historical cycles of subservience to the land and machines, humans would
finally be released to find meaning in other, less material pursuits.
In discussing the capacity oftechnology to transform the workplace, Diebold
sought to exploit a crucial difference between the rise of automation and previ-
ous periods ofeconomic transition. In contrast to the rhetoric that accompanied
the extended conversion from agricultural to industrial labor, few romanticized
the labor regime that postindustrialism was bound to supplant. Nineteenth-
century debates about industrialization had fixated on the many degrada-
tions of factory life, including its grinding hours, strict adherence to a time
discipline, monotonous routines, and rigid organizational hierarchies. Such con-
cerns had only been heightened by the early twentieth-century advent of Tay
lorism, with its attentiveness to the minutest details of each employee's mo-
tions and output, and the introduction of the assembly line, with its breakdown
ofproduction into the repetitive performance of ever more minute and special-
ized tasks. The management vogues of the 1930s and 1940s, beginning with El-
ton Mayo's The Human Problems ofan Industrial Civilization, had been defined
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in large part by their expressions ofdissatisfaction with the industrial order and
their attempts to create alternative approaches to the workplace that softened
its hours, subverted its hierarchies, and diminished its reliance on routinized
tasks Diebold saw resistance to new factory and business technologies as a mis-
guided holdover from these previous eras of technological change. Instead, he
argued, automation should be seen as an epochal subversion. New control tech-
nologies would eliminate the need for humans to perform the most degrading
aspects of industrial labor and free them to perform the more creative, holistic,
and integrative functions that theorists such as Mayo had long sought. Auto-
mation was a harbinger of liberation from, rather than further subservience to,
the machine.
Thus, Diebold was quick to shift conversation away from the prospect of
technological unemployment, with all the anxieties it provoked, and toward
changes in the kinds of work people would be required to do. "What a waste of
human resources it is at present to have a human being, capable of all a human
can do and feel and express, standing in an assembly line tightening nuts!," he
wrote in 1952.s5 In an automated world, "the jobs in which the worker is tied to
and paced by the machine will be taken over by other machines," and the "worker
will be released for work permitting development ofhis inherent human capaci
ties.66 These new technologies promised "freedom from many of the routine,
machine-paced tasks ofindustry, the very types ofjobswhich have given rise to
the criticism that industrialization has enslaved men and made the machine his
master."67
According to Diebold, the incessant debate about technological unemploy-
ment signified a failure to comprehend the true significance of the decline of
unskilled labor. The future would be marked not by the disappearance of jobs
but rather by their transfiguration: an automated society would allow people to
fulfill their fully human qualities without being forced to mimic the repetitive
capacities ofa machine. It would yield an influx ofnew positions oriented toward
the creation, maintenance, and operation ofcontrol devices, as demand rapidly
expanded for "technicians, programmers, specialized people to work on the
machines." Perhaps more importantly, the massive gains in productivity would
create new positions for "creative workers of all kinds-scientists, professionals,
managers, service workers, communicators, artists, and craftsmen."s8 Govern-
ments should therefore focus not on generating new sources of employment, but
rather on fostering the capacities that these new roles would require. Employment
in an automated society would require "ability to think, increased imagina-
tion and judgment, and increased understanding of mathematical and logical
methods-in brief, increased education."9 If earlier stages of industrial society
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had required people to suppress their capacities in order to fixate on the efi-
cient performance of repetitive tasks, this new age would once again enable the
cultivation of the self.
Business advocates and their favored economists adopted variations of this
message, arguing that automation would enable industrial workers to overcome
the problems that previous technological advances had caused. By directing em-
ployment away from machine-tool operations and toward maintenance and
engineering, the University of Chicago economist Yale Brozen argued in 1956,
automation made work "less routine, more creative," more demanding of "skill
and judgment," and more worthy of "interest.70 Marshall Munce, vice presi-
dent of the York Corporation and a director ofthe National Association ofMan-
ufacturers, spun such ideas into an idealistic vision in his testimony before the
congressional subcommittee on automation in 1955. With monotonous jobs re-
placed by "unfeeling machines," he predicted, "man will be the master of the
machine rather than the servant. Life in America will be richer, better, more
rewarding."" The American worker, Time argued in 1961, may well be able to
"have his cake and eat it too: the material rewards ofmass-produced abundance
and the satisfaction that comes from performing an intricate and responsible
job." Such workers would preserve the benefits of "Henry Ford's assembly lines"
without the "dirty and drudge work" they had previously required.72
By the late 1950s, some management theorists had begun to emphasize that
the age ofautomation would be characterized by the special social and economic
value accorded to "knowledge" Peter Drucker became the preeminent spokes
man for this emerging view. An Austrian émigré who arrived in the United
States during World War 11, Drucker rose to prominence in the late 1940s as
the author of a study of management practices at General Motors, The Concept
of the Corporation. Building on the work of Elton Mayo, he argued that corpo-
rations would increase their employees' productivity (and maintain more
amicable labor relations) if they fostered a greater sense of autonomy?3 At first,
Drucker represented worker engagement in the enterprise as a managerial
problem, and he became widely known as an expert in organizational struc-
ture. During the 1950s, however, he became convinced that new technologies
were rendering the problems of monotony and alienation increasingly obso-
lete. The stultifying repetition of assembly-line labor would no longer be an
issue "on the production floor oftomorrow's push button factory." he told read-
ers of Harper's in 1955. Like Diebold, he foresaw extraordinary new demand
for "highly skilled" employees to install, control, and repair the machines, for
"highly educated men" to design and engineer the machinery, and for "man-
agers" who would be able "to think, to analyze, to make decisions, and to assume
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risks" amid increasingly rapid change" Automation would largely eliminate the
most deadening forms of industrial labor, replacing them with positions that
required skil, judgment, and a capacity for adaptation.
According to Drucker, the great challenge for contemporary societies would
be the development of an educational infrastructure capable oftraining employ-
ees for this very different business environment. In previous eras, he argued,
the primary source of competitive advantage for both businesses and individuals
lay in manual labor. Beyond a very low threshold, education was unproductive,
and its highest levels were conspicuously oriented toward activities consid-
ered "nonwork." But in recent years the rapid pace of technological change had
sharply devalued experience, repeatedly rendering it useless with the arrival of
new products and production techniques. Those who worked with their hands
suddenly found themselves "unproductive" when compared with machines that
performed work more quickly and at lower cost. Productivity had shifted in-
stead to those who developed an understanding of these novel technologies, or
the capacity to anticipate changes with more speed and insight than their com-
petitors. Drucker described their occupations as "knowledge work," and boldly
proclaimed that they were in possession of "the only real capital today."75 Due
to the technological advances of automation, the United States was transition-
ing from a society that traficked primarily in goods to one that trafficked pri-
marily in ideas
Drucker's writings in the late 1950s and 1960s helped to generate many of
the tropes of the subsequent literature on the "knowledge," "creative," or "in-
formation" society. In doing so, their political implications transformed. In his
earlier work, Drucker saw his line of inquiry as closely aligned with Elton Mayo's:
he hoped to help foster new practices and organizational structures that would
help managers overcome the stifling effects of industrial labor and the corpo-
rate form.5 His primary goal was to transform businesses to better meet the so-
cial and political needs of their employees. In shifting his emphasis to the rise
ofthe "knowledge" economy, Drucker suggested that such preoccupations were
no longer necessary. By virtue of the different jobs that automation fostered,
capitalism was beginning to resolve its longtime contradictions. Markets were
Overcoming the problems of industrial labor without requiring intervention
from the private sector or the state. Executives could therefore redirect their at-
tention away from the thorny problems of labor relations and focus instead on
the crucial subject of "innovation," which would become the crucible ofbusiness
Success. After having risen to prominence by arguing that business and policy
labors needed to restructure their organizations to address the problem ofalien-
ation, he now suggested that this challenge could be effaced by the progress of
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technology. In the parlance of contemporary Austrian economists, Drucker
saw markets as tending toward a spontaneous order in certain circumstances
but not others. The institutional circumstances of the industrial economy
generated pathologies that required aggressive measures to resolve; while the
knowledge economy tended toward catallaxy, and therefore required less active
intervention and oversight.
As Drucker's evolution suggests, writings on the rise of a knowledge society
often served as a propaedeutic to a conservative worldview. A shift in employment
away from manual and repetitive tasks and toward more "creative" endeavors
disarmed some critics of the alienation induced by capitalism, and created a
potent challenge for those who sought to resist the encroachments of automa-
tion. With no recourse to romantic conceptions ofthe industrial past, many such
critics conceded that the labor requirements of a postindustrial society might
prove more fulfilling than those they supplanted. Georges Friedmann, a French
sociologist who valorized craft skill and maintained deep reservations about
Drucker's "technician's Utopia," readily acknowledged that automation would
reveal the subdivision of jobs under industrialism to have been "a transitory
form of labor, and often a pathological one."77 The Frankfurt School theorist
Friedrich Pollock, in the midst of a book critiquing the cultural and employ
ment implications of automation, allowed that it "spares workers from much
soul-destroying drudgery.78 And Walter Reuther tempered his proposals for
measures that would protect against the dangers of automation witha frank rec-
ognition of its potential benefits. "Automation can bring freedom from the mo-
notonous drudgery ofmany jobs in which the worker today is no more than a
servant of the machine" he told Congress in 1955. "It can free workers from rou-
tine, repetitive tasks which the new machines can be taught to do, and can give
to the workers who toil on these tasks the opportunity of developing higher
skills." Critics of automation were temporally unmoored-skeptical of the
technological future, dissatisfied with the present, and unwilling to find solace
in the recent past. Even those who sought to contest the transformative social
vision propounded by advocates such as Diebold and Drucker found themselves
conceding many of its terms.
For those who remained unwilling to acknowledge the benefits of automation,
Diebold resorted to a final line of argumentation. Debating its ultimate merits
was bound to be a pointless enterprise, he suggested, because-regardless of
one's opinions-it was certain to progress. It is "as inevitable as union dues and
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taxes" he told an audience at the Case Institute of Technology in 1955s0 Any
technological advance that led to such obvious efficiency gains would necessar-
ily overcome all sources of resistance. "Automation cannot be stopped," he wrote
in Challenge magazine in 1959; "like the steam engine and the automatic loom,
it must be lived with and managed as well aspossible."3 Further, it had devel-
oped an autonomous logic that led to its continuous encroachment into new ven-
ues of infuence. As he explained to students at Rollins College, "technological
advance has become self-generating.82 The adoption ofautomated technologies
in certain areas ofhuman life was facilitating its expansion to others, in a pro-
gression that appeared to demand little human planning or control. Viewed
from this perspective, the entire debate over the merits and desirability of auto-
mation seemed a misguided distraction; public discussion should focus on how
to accomplish, not whether to resist, its adoption.
Even discussions about how to manage the progress of automation, accord-
ing to Diebold, could proceed only under terms that were overdetermined by
the economic pressures of the Cold War. In the 1952 bookAutomation he warned
that "it is only by increasing output per manhour worked that we will be able to
build effective defense against the aggressive powers of communism." There
after, he closely monitored Russian advances in control technologies and warned
his audiences that delays in their adoption were bound to yield an advantage to
the Communists. Thus the Soviet creation ofa "Ministry ofAutomation" in 1956
signified a superior policy commitment to automated technologies, and Khrush-
chev's comment that automation would enable his people to "beat you capital-
ists" provided an unflattering contrast with the "fear and defensiveness" at
home.s4 In Diebold's view, the progress of automation could be slowed but not
halted, and delays in its adoption would produce disadvantages in a global ide-
ological war. Sowhile he may have shared concerns about its social and cultural
implications, he emphasized that American society was impotent to act upon
them. The independent logic of technological advancement and the pressures
of economic competition suggested that, regardless of their merits, all philo-
sophical debates about the human dimensions of technological change would
prove futile.
Critics of the social implications of technological change were troubled by
Such an emphasis on inevitability, as it suggested that human societies were suf-
fering a worrisome loss of control over their own social and institutional devel
opment.85 But despite these reservations, they struggled to develop alternative
theories of technological development that established a clear and coherent space
for political intervention. The result was a literature that reiterated Diebold's
sense of inevitability with a melancholy rather than a triumphalist tone. In one
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such text, The Technological Society, the sociologist and theologian Jacques
Ellul interpreted the rise of control technology as both a manifestation and cause
of the contemporary proliferation of "technique." The meaning of "technique
had long been slippery and contested, but Ellul framed it in broad terms, defin-
ing it as "nothing more than means and the ensemble ofmeans."6 Over centu
ries, he argued, societies had become ever more fixated on the refinement of
means and less concerned with the ends they were intended to achieve. Indus.
trial machines were only a recent manifestation of technique, but their prolif.
eration represented a culminating moment, as the very origin of their being lay
in their identity as a means to a preconceived end. In his terms, machines were
"solely, exclusively, technique," and their embodiment of its ethos was "pure"7
With the rise ofautomation and the growing entwinement of science and tech
nology, technique had now "arrived at such a point in its evolution that it is
being transformed and is progressing almost without decisive intervention by
man.* In other terms, it had become "autonomous," rapidly digesting tradi-
tional values and ways of life without allowing humans to intercede. Ellul shared
Diebold's sense that these developments were ineluctable; in his view, even re-
sistance movements were inexorably assimilated into the technological society
they opposed. But whereas Diebold urged the necessity of reconciliation, Ellul
framed this narrative in tragic terms. "Enclosed within his artificial creation,"
he wrote, "man finds that there is 'no exit'; he cannot pierce the shell oftechnol-
ogy to find again the ancient milieu to which he was adapted for hundreds of
thousands of years."89
Other critics of the direction of technological change searched for ways to
exert more control over its development. In a 1964 speech, Lewis Mumford
agreed with Ellul's argument that automated machines embodied a pathologi-
cal fixation on thinly defined means. An automatic system "is so fixed and rigid
that it seems little more than a neat, mechanical model ofa compulsion neuro-
sis," Mumford wrote.0 By allowing such machines to proliferate, societies were
wiping out, with no sense of the colossal loss, all natural richness and diver
sity, all ecological complexity, all independent human selectivity and purpose
fulness." And like Ellul, Mumford worried that this process was increasingly
unfolding with an autonomous logic, admitting "no 'feedback' and therefore no
method of evaluating its deleterious results or correcting its mistaken postu-
lates."2 We were now confronted, in his pithy terms, by the "automation of
automation," or the "organized impotence" ofhuman societies.3 But in contrast
to Ellul, Mumford expressed continued faith in the human capacity to reverse
this trajectory, which he expressed in vague but urgent terms. "Our task, I shall
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urge he wrote, "is rather to restore to man, as the central agent and creator,
the wide span ofcapabilities and potentialities he voluntarily surrendered or sup-
pressed when he took it upon himselfto develop the machine and consigned to
automatons the absolute powers once exercised by divine kings."4 The Myth of
the Machine aimed to create a critical energy that would reverse the trajectory
oftechnological development, without clarifying the specific political form such
a resistance might take.
Diebold argued that any such resistance was misguided, due to its reliance
on a binary understanding of humans and machines that was rapidly becom-
ing outmoded. Ellul and Mumford centered their critiques on a series of di-
chotomies: the flexibility, organicism, intelligence, and rich diversity ofhuman
society were contrasted with the rigidity, artificiality, dumbness, and unidirec
tionality of machine tools. To Diebold, such an analysis missed the crucial
distinction between automated machines and their predecessors. Automation,
via the feedback principle, was defined precisely by its flexibility, its capacity to
mimic the sensory responses of organic creatures, its ability to reproduce (and
even exceed) substantial dimensions ofhuman inteligence, and its adaptiveness
to an extraordinary range ofproductive tasks. The advent of automation there-
fore represented not an extension ofthe logic of industrial machines, but rather
its sublimation. The boundaries between machines and human societies were
becoming blurred, but this was attributable to the humanization ofmachinery
rather than the mechanization ofhumankind.
Other advocates ofautomation adopted similar logic to arrive at still bolder
claims about the novel organicism of automated machines. As Peter Drucker
wrote in his first article about the concept of automation, it could be called "an
organic' philosophy-if only to distinguish it from the strictly mechanistic
approach on which Henry Ford's concept of mass production was based."5 Its
foundation in "self-regulating control" enabled it to respond to economic ac-
tivity as a dynamic "process" based on "pattern, order, orform" rather than as a
static event. To reduce automation to "gadgeteering" or "engineering" was there-
fore to miss its fundamental insight and contribution: "it is a concept of the struc-
ture and order of economic life, the design of its basic patterns integrated into
a harmonious, balanced, and organic whole"6 Control technologies enabled
machines to become reactive, dynamic, and newly capable of integrating them-
selves into complex systems; the arrival of automation signified the decline of
the rigidities of industrial "technique" and the arrival of the organic machine.
As another theorist who emphasized the organic capacities ofautomated ma-
chines, Marshall McLuhan, later wrote: "automation retains only as much of the
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mechanical character as the motorcar kept of the forms of the horse and the car.
riage."7 Any lingering similarities of form obscured a radically different moti
vating principle.
By emphasizing the organic character of automation, theorists such as
Diebold, Drucker, and McLuhan sought to bypass debates about the inevitabil.
ity oftechnological change. In their view, the advent ofautomatic controls should
not have provoked concern over the expanding remit accorded to machines.
Rather, its significance lay in a shift in the kinds ofmachines that interacted with
human societies. New technologies mimicked the activities ofanimals and ner-
vous systems, providing a supple and reactive connective tissue that responded
to complex stimuli in sophisticated ways. Their inexorable advance was a cause
for celebration rather than reconciliation or resistance. As the industrial era
neared its end, society could overcome an excess ofmechanization by acceler
ating, rather than forestalling, its progress.
The Rise and Fall ofthe New Deal Orderwas a prescient and wide-ranging voł
ume that did much to establish the parameters of historical research on mid-
century political economy in an era when such questions had fallen out of
fashion. In retrospect, however, its contributions said remarkably little about the
role technology played in the narrative arc ofAmerican political history between
Roosevelt and Reagan. This lacuna is surely attributable, in part, to the surrep-
titious presentism that marks each generation ofhistorical research. IfDiebold's
"age ofautomation" was marked by a sense ofdeep excitement and uncertainty
about the political implications of emerging technologies, the period between
the 1970s and 1990s was characterized by a diminished faith in their transfor-
mative potential. Trends that had appeared clear, urgent, and radical in the
context of the early 1950s began to seem hazy, sluggish, and doubtful with the
passage of time. The contraction of manufacturing employment, however in-
exorable, proved slow: absolute numbers held steady even as its relative position
continued a steady decline.8 The dramatic contraction of the workweek over
the first halfof the twentieth century did not continue into the second, and the
predicted age ofleisure never fully matured." Concerns about technological un-
employment continued to shadow government job reports but were gradually
eclipsed by anxieties about an energy shortage, inflation, and the rise of out-
sourcing in a newly globalized economy.00 The economic troubles of the early
1970s left few speaking of the structural problems of "abundance," as the eco-
nomics of scarcity returned again to the center of national debates.01 And the
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most exorbitant predictions of the futurists of the 1950s seemed to grow more
distant with the passage of time: the space factories, flying cars, rocket mail-
men, and universal vending machines that populated the comics of the era gave
way to a new tenor of disappointment in the limits of technology's largesse.102
As the specific nature of this "revolution" dispersed into ambiguities and
conflicting terminologies, the disciplines that had charted it drifted into other
lines of inquiry. In the 1970s sociologists became less engaged in questions of
public policy, and political economy became ever more marginal to their inter-
nal debates.0 The last vestiges of institutionalism disappeared from the eco-
nomics profession, leaving Robert Heilbroner and John Kenneth Galbraith
among the few outliers who continued to write about the social dynamics cre-
ated by structural change.104 The diminished American community of Marx-
ists became increasingly engaged with literary and cultural concerns, devoting
limited attention to the logic of capital in a postindustrial age. 05 And many of
those who continued to ask such questions deplored the parochialism ofearlier
eras, arguing that the pattern of "abundance some had observed in the 1950s
was the product of a "world system" that continued to rely on the dynamics
of scarcity.06 Even "futurism," which had inspired an extraordinary burst of
organizational energy in postwar decades, became relegated to an increasingly
discredited fringe.
With a characteristic fealty to its cognate disciplines, the historical profes-
sion, too, devoted dwindling resources to the kinds of structural questions that
the early writers on automation had posed. In the 1960s and 1970s an emerging
generation of historians revolted against the grand narratives that had charac-
terized many of the most prominent works of an earlier era, privileging the
localized empiricism of social history and the textually bounded exegeses
associated with the cultural turn. Political historians became marginalized, in-
tellectual historians retrenched, and economic history increasingly migrated
to economics departments. Many of those scholars who remained interested in
political economy directed their work toward the more focused problematics of
business and labor history07 As a result of these shifting methodological incli-
nations, issues that preoccupied the early theorists of automation-the move-
ment from manufacturing to services, the psychological effects of temporary
employment, the emergence of a "knowledge" economy, the transforming char-
acter of leisure, and the cultural implications of technological change-fell
to the margins of disciplinary inquiry. The dramatic political, intellectual, and
cultural reconfigurations of the postwar decades were often relayed with only
glancing reference to these underlying transformations in the conditions of
economic life.
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Recent years, however, have witnessed a revival of interest in the problems
that preoccupied theorists amid the onset of debates about cybernetics and
postindustrialism. In our own era ofsmartphones and autonomous cars, renew
able energy and digital libraries, genetic testing and private spacecraft, the pal-
pability of technological change has fostered glimmers of utopianism, futurist
consultancies, and a new generation of popular seers. Scholars are once again
writing that we have entered a "second machine age," in which our experience
of work and leisure will be upended by the development of spectacular ma-
chines.08 Economists are speculating about the shape and implications of the
emerging information economy, in which the revaluation of skills may continue
increasing inequalities and punishing those who possess "average" capacities,09
Sociologists and geographers have returned their attention to the dynamics of
economic systems and the cultural effects of the diminishing fixity and neces-
sity ofwork.0 The chastened technological imagination of the final quarter of
the twentieth century now seems an interregnum between periods ofbroad con-
fidence in the capacity of technology to transform the patterns ofeveryday life.
Surveying the similarities between these successive waves of techno-
optimism, some might be inclined to feel cynical about the thinness of the
boundary between forecast and fantasy. Recurrent promises of revolution can
seem a mere distraction from an underlying stasis in the technological devel-
opment of the United States since midcentury. Where, as David Graeber recently
asked in the Bafiler, are our flying cars?" But protracted delays in the arrival of
some predicted technologies should not obscure the depth and breadth of trans-
formations that have percolated through workplaces since the 1950s. Diebold's
writings anticipated many aspects of the information-rich, financialized, skill-
differentiated, and service-centered structures of economic life in the con-
temporary United States. The crucial question for contemporary readers, then,
is whether he was right to express such broad optimism about their social and
political implications. Has the shifting composition of the employment market
helped to resolve the problems of estranged labor, or have workers' feelings of
alienation merely transferred from one job to another? Have novel production
capacities produced widespread dividends in both leisure and material goods,
or has the resulting displacement of labor generated new political instabilities?
Have intelligent machines become an extension of human needs and desires,
or a growing threat to psychological well-being? Has the dificulty of exerting
political control over emerging technologies given business leaders the freedom
to foster dynamism and growth, or generated widespread feelings of political
disillusionment and democratic deficit? Despite frequent claims of a current
technological disjunction, Diebold's writings remind us that such problems have
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unfolded since the Second World War, accompanying (and in some cases precioitating) th unraveli g of the New Deal order. The temporal d pth of this
reansformation should be cause for relief: debates about present-day problems
invariably rely on projections about the future, which can only be cobbled to-
ether out of extrapolations from the past. History is never more relevant than
in the midst of a futurist age.
.








